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Private Investment in Brownfield Redevelopment in the Greater
Philadelphia Area: A Case-Study Analysis
Ryan Kraske
ABSTRACT Brownfield redevelopment is a critical urban renewal tool that until recently
has been overlooked by developers interested in less risky, pristine greenfields. Reformed
legislation and public recognition of the negative effects of urban sprawl has made many
investors realize the economic potential of brownfield redevelopment. This paper investigates the
regulatory framework and incentives for attracting private investment in brownfield
redevelopment in the greater Philadelphia area. It specifically examines three different
reclamation projects and evaluates the effectiveness of their redevelopment procedures through
site selection, remediation process, utilization of incentives, and impacts on the community.
Through the availability of extensive incentive programs, liability and clean-up costs are no
longer at the forefront of developers’ concerns. The analysis finds that a successful brownfield
project developer must choose a site in strategic location, have a long-term vision, and consider
the input from and benefit to the surrounding community. The final analysis provides
recommendations to promote economically viable brownfield program and project
implementation in the future.

I. Introduction
As a response to the impractical and destructive nature of urban sprawl, it is imperative that we
embrace more effective policy and planning methods to redirect new development back to our
urban centers. Infill development reuses existing infrastructure to create higher density to
accommodate growth as an alternative to expanding into greenfields. Brownfield redevelopment
is a quintessential urban renewal tool that is becoming increasingly more recognized by planners
and economic development specialists around the country. Their efforts have resulted in the
implementation of a variety of incentives—liability protection, tax-relief, public subsidies—that
are being used to promote private investment in brownfield redevelopment. 1 As a result of new
federal and state legislation, it is now possible to reap substantial profits from development of
contaminated lands. 2 Thousands of idle properties around the country are now being
redeveloped for residential, commercial, open space, and industrial reuse, thereby improving the
local economies and community quality of life. 3
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The literature on the incentives that promote private investment in brownfield
redevelopment is expanding rapidly. Many research studies have found that the attractive
incentives generally include some type of regulatory reform or liability relief. 4 Other studies
have examined the importance of community participation (Bartsch, 2003), interagency
coordination, and strong public and private leadership (ICMA/NEMW, 2001). Many of the case
studies have investigated the incentives and other drivers that have shaped the development of
brownfields, often focusing on the more successful projects and failing to address the less
successful ones. 5 More importantly, few have evaluated why certain projects fail or sought to
elucidate the factors involved in slowing the process. Few make recommendations as to what
should be done to avoid unsuccessful redevelopment projects. In an effort to reclaim the
abandoned properties, Pennsylvania has taken a lead role in developing a land recycling program
to encourage private investors to redevelop brownfields. The purpose of this paper is to explore
the usefulness and effectiveness of the programs through an analysis of three case studies of
private investment in brownfield reclamation in the greater Philadelphia area. It will provide
recommendations to local government officials and developers on the most important elements
to consider when managing a redevelopment project.

II. Definition and Developer Interest in Brownfields
Although there is no universal definition, brownfields have commonly been defined as
“abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or
redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination.” 6 It is
estimated that there are as many as one million brownfields that tarnish the landscapes of
communities across the country. 7 They may have been home to former industrial/manufacturing
establishments, gas stations, mines, landfills, shopping malls, dry cleaning establishments and
other activities that may have generated contamination. They contribute to health hazards,
blight, residential flight, property depreciation, and disinvestment in urban and suburban
communities. 8 Pennsylvania’s vast industrial heritage has left behind an estimated 10,00012,000 brownfield sites—some 100,000-120,000 acres of prime real estate sitting vacant and—
after assessment for contamination—ready for development. 9
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Previous research suggests that by carefully redeveloping brownfield sites, we can cleanup environmental hazards, create jobs, remove urban blight, boost tax revenue, and improve the
economic health of the local communities. 10 By redeveloping brownfields we can ease the
development pressure on green space and farmland, by reducing urban sprawl. One encouraging
statistic cited by the EPA states that one acre of brownfield offsets 4.5 acres of greenfield
development. 11 Brownfield redevelopment is a winning proposition for both our environment
and the economy.

Not all brownfield sites are likely to be developed. Many smaller, poorly located, and
functionally obsolete brownfields may never be developed. 12 The probability that a brownfield
can be assembled into an adequate size is of prime importance when considering whether it can
be developed. 13 The primary focus of developer investment interests is on the sites that are
viable for economic development. Economically viable brownfields are defined as underutilized
properties with actual or perceived environmental liabilities that, due to their inherently positive
market attributes, may be economically developed into productive assets. 14 Many viable
brownfields have desirable site characteristics such as location on a waterfront or access to mass
transit. Many of these sites are highly accessible and have roads, sewers, power sources, and
other infrastructure already in place. 15 Developers that are acutely aware of the potential rewards
typically buy well-located brownfield sites at a significant discount where demand is substantial,
and then remediate the site using risked-based criteria and real estate strategies that design the
site around the remaining contamination to reduce the risk to future occupants. 16

Most developers are also aware that projects generally succeed only when a cooperative
relationship has been established with the immediate community. In some cases, developers may
encounter less neighborhood resistance during the development process because it is perceived
that they are cleaning up pollution and removing blight. 17 In other cases, additional complexities
may arise when a community feels threatened by new development and claim environmental
injustice. 18 Therefore, the determination of the future end-use of a site and associated clean-up
goals is an issue that requires a private developer to conduct extensive community outreach to
strive to achieve plans that are mutually acceptable to both the developer and the community.
Developers should consider public health improvements, potential job creation, and the overall
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fit of the new development in the neighborhood. 19 If public health and environmental justice
concerns arise, formal meetings should be held with the community before undertaking any
remediation and construction procedures, to allow for their meaningful participation. These
meetings should be attended by the developer, community members, city officials, and state
officials (if requested) so that they can fully understand the potentially impacted communities
and reach a mutual agreement on what steps are necessary to implement a successful brownfield
redevelopment project. 20

III. The Brownfield Problem
A. Origins

Historically, brownfields were difficult to develop because of the cost and the risk
involved. Developers and investors had to consider the additional expense of cleaning up
contaminated land as part of the site preparation. They also had to assume the inherent risk and
unknowns related to the adequacy of the remediation from the perspective of the regulators and
lenders. 21

At contaminated sites, overall redevelopment costs clearly may be higher than at noncontaminated sites—although cleanup expenses may be offset by lower acquisition costs. High
transaction costs are common in brownfield redevelopment projects. These may include
expenses for investigating the presence and extent of contamination, costs associated with
project delays due to assessments and cleanup, higher fees for loans due to higher underwriting
costs, and additional legal expenses for environmental and regulatory activities. In some cases,
the redeveloped site may incur additional expenses for monitoring.22 Additional difficulties with
site assembly and remediation may delay a project’s timing, which could cause it to miss a
market window. 23 The cleanup costs and potential development delay that are associated with
many of these sites is complicated further by other burdens such as blight, crime, absentee
landlords, decaying infrastructure that discourage reinvestment and contribute to distressed
neighborhoods. 24 Even after clean-up, many sites may bear the stigma of being “polluted land”
that may lower sale or rental value.
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The second major reason most brownfields have remained vacant for years is fear of
liability and uncertainty. 25 These fears were largely compounded by strict federal regulations of
their redevelopment. After the discovery of massive environmental problems in New York’s
Love Canal, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) (1980) to govern the clean up of abandoned hazardous waste disposal
sites. Commonly referred to as the Superfund Law, it allowed the EPA to investigate potentially
contaminated sites, decide who is responsible for cleaning it up, and force responsible parties to
pay. The “strict, joint, and several, and retroactive liability” clause under CERCLA declared that
all persons associated with the polluted site were liable during the cleanup process, regardless of
who was responsible for polluting it. 26 The liability was also open-ended—the property owner
can be forced to pay for future clean-up if more tests detect additional or previously unknown
contamination. 27 This liability has the potential to include the owners of the land, the banks that
financed the purchase, the firm that generated the waste, the transporter, and the disposal firm.
Thus, any prospective purchaser, remediation company, or fiduciary institution that became
associated with a brownfield property assumed great financial risk and potential liability for its
cleanup. 28

One sector that best illustrates this fear of this liability is banking. Under the terms of
CERCLA, lending institutions can be held liable if they assume financial control of a
contaminated property. 29 In response, loan officers often require expensive and time consuming
environmental assessments of potential loan recipient’s property when there is the slightest
suspicion of contamination. In 1990, the American Bankers Association’s survey of 2,000
lending institutions revealed that 62.5 percent had rejected loan applications based on the small
possibility of environmental contamination. 30 Owners of industrial properties have also been
deterred from seeking new uses for their old properties and instead, boarded them up or
abandoned them rather then running the risk of having the discovery of contamination result in
liability for their clean up.

In addition, the EPA required that all former industrial sites must meet an extremely high
level of remediation—enough for residential use. 31 This level of clean up would often require
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millions of dollars more than if the site were cleaned to a lesser standard that would be imposed
for industrial reuse. Another critical problem that the EPA found while trying to identify parties
responsible for clean up was that many sites have been abandoned so long that the past polluters
no longer existed as corporate entities. 32 Therefore, much of the money, resources, and time
associated with the Superfund Law are locked in endless litigation. The inadvertent effect of
environmental legislation that was designed to spur brownfield redevelopment had instead
stymied it. 33

B. Legislative Reform

Various federal legislative and regulatory reforms throughout the 1990s somewhat
reduced concerns about potential liability throughout the 1990s, but more dramatic changes have
occurred with the development of state-level voluntary clean-up programs. These programs
encourage owners and developers to voluntarily come forward to address site contamination, in
exchange for less stringent cleanup requirements and liability relief from future federal scrutiny
of the site. 34

Finally, in 2002, Congress enacted the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfield
Revitalization Act to modify CERCLA and encouraged the private sector to redevelop
brownfields. The new legislation protected contiguous property owners, prospective purchasers,
and persons who undertake cleanups of the properties from CERCLA liability and clarified
innocent landholders’ defense to liability issues. 35 The Act provided funding both to state
brownfield programs and to local governments who seek to return brownfield properties to
productive uses such as commercial, residential, industrial, and green space. 36 It funded grants to
communities and states for pre-clean up activities, environmental assessments, and cleanup
planning and design. 37

The new legislation has provided tax incentives, such as tax credits, which would reduce
the capital needed for many brownfield projects. Second, grant money has been given to cities or
states to directly finance the cleanup process or capitalize in revolving loan funds. Third, the
new legislation has provided fairly extensive liability clarifications, which protect innocent
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people, new buyers, or neighboring property owners for having to pay for cleanup. The primary
objective of this new legislation is to encourage private owners to redevelop brownfield sites and
protect the environment. 38

The most popular and successful component of the legislation is the allocation of grant
money. The four types of grants that have been administered by EPA and supported and
authorized by Congress are assessment, clean-up, job training, and revolving loan. 39 Assessment
grants provide funding for a grant recipient to make assessment, conduct planning, and organize
community involvement related to redeveloping a brownfield site. The total grant funds allowed
to a community-wide recipient may not exceed $400,000 and are dependent on the amount of
hazardous waste, contaminants, and petroleum pollution a specific site contains. 40 Most grants
given to an individual recipient are no more than $200,000. 41

Clean-up grants are given to carry out remediation activities at brownfield sites. They are
distributed to a recipient mostly for the removal of contaminated soil, groundwater testing,
capping sites, and the removal of asbestos or lead paint from abandoned buildings. They require
that the recipient provide a cost share of 20% of the clean-up activities. 42 This cost share may be
in the form of labor, services, material, or money and it can be waived if because of a hardship. 43

Job-training grants provide workforce development opportunities through environmental
training and recruitment of trainees from economically disadvantaged communities, and provide
the experience for workers who hope to develop skills for jobs related to brownfield cleanup.
They forge partnerships between community colleges, local job training organizations,
community groups, lenders, and developers to help revitalize the brownfields properties on
social, economic, and environmental levels. A grant of up to $200, 000 is awarded to provide
training for hazardous waste clean-up. 44

Revolving loan fund grants are a fourth type of incentive provided by federal legislation.
These are grants of up to $1 million per recipient, available for five years, which provide the
capital for low interest loan funds to pay for site clean-up activities. These capitalization grants
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can go to local governments, states, Indian tribes, and redevelopment agencies. A 20% cost share
in the form of money, labor, or services is required. 45

At brownfield sites where water quality is an issue, there are special clean water state
revolving loan funds to finance activities that can be use to correct or prevent water quality
problems. The clean water state revolving loan fund has an excess of $27 billion in assets and
has issued over $23 billion in loans since 1998. 46 Currently, it is responsible for funding nearly
$3 billion worth of water quality projects annually. 47 State programs also support clean water
state revolving loan funds within EPA guidelines. State revolving funds can be used to cover
costs of the disposal of underground storage tanks, capping wells, and excavation and removal of
contaminated soil. Loans are repaid through local taxes, fees paid by developers, or recreational
fees. 48

EPA’s current brownfield program is based on collaborative efforts, cooperation, and
voluntary action rather than strict regulation. 49 As a whole, the incentive package has
successfully helped convert many brownfields into productive mixed-use developments that
restore economic vigor to a community and provide for greater livability.

C. Non- Environmental Barriers to Redevelopment

Although the environmental status of a site is certainly an important factor in its potential
for redevelopment, many other factors influence the decisions of developers and businesses to
redevelop brownfields, or instead choose suburban ‘greenfields.’ Professor Heidi Robertson of
Columbia Law School argues that environmental barriers are but one piece of a complicated
puzzle in the arena of brownfield redevelopment. 50 Non-environmental factors such as the size
and location of the site and infrastructure issues, that largely affect the way sites are marketed,
are often overlooked. Unless government officials focus on these factors, they cannot
substantially succeed in encouraging urban renewal and reducing blight. 51
Non-environmental factors that typically affect the market value of a site include:
•

Site location, size, accessibility, and configuration

•

Existing buildings and infrastructure (roads, sewer, electric power, transportation)
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•

Zoning and likelihood of rezoning, and environmental regulations

•

State and local tax burden on the site property

•

Availability of and protections offered by liability insurance

•

Access to markets (labor, materials, and output)

•

Cost of land and labor 52

In a survey of attitudes of location and expansion held by three dozen private firms in the
state of Ohio, Robertson, et al., found that non-environmental factors (suggested above) still play
a far more important role than environmental liabilities in influencing location decisions. 53

According to Professor Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School, “vacant land and
empty buildings often do not translate into lower-cost real estate because of the difficulty of
assembling appropriate sized parcels from fragmented quarter and half-acre lots.” 54 In addition,
demolition of existing buildings on a site as well as the litigation involved in unpredictable
zoning battles surrounding the site can be considerably expensive. Once existing buildings have
been demolished, the “high cost of construction [of new buildings on an urban brownfield site] is
driven up by city traffic congestions, restrictive buildings codes, and higher bids due in part to
union requirements and minority preferences.” 55 Other disadvantages of using existing inner
city buildings result from multi-story layouts, low ceilings, floor instability, and lack of loading
docks. For these reasons they may compare unfavorably to suburban locations. 56
Meyer and Lyons (2000) found that developers prefer larger sites (of at least 5 acres). 57
Lots of this size allows developers and investors to recoup their investments to an acceptable
level, which is estimated to be a high of approximately 20% for residential development to a low
of 8% for industrial redevelopment. 58

Researchers Simons and El Jaouhari (2001) conclude that a “key point [for understanding
brownfields] is the consideration of economic factors, especially the real estate market”. 59 Hula
(2003) finds that brownfield redevelopment in Michigan occurs in more desirable areas that are
not blighted. 60 As a result, redevelopment opportunities are available in recovering or recovered
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neighborhoods and communities, creating more attractive markets for these reclamation
projects. 61

It is important to note that no amount of remediation can restore a brownfield if the real
estate value is low. 62 Developers and investors need to know that the property value exceeds cost
of acquisition and redevelopment costs, which are often complicated by future risks of additional
remediation or the uncertainty of economic development potential of a neighborhood adjacent to
the property. 63 Other important considerations include the visibility of the location, access to
interstate highways and airports, high population densities, and consumer traffic. 64

IV. Pennsylvania’s Land Recycling Program
Pennsylvania’s Land Recycling Program is one of the most progressive and successful programs
in the country. Signed into law by Governor Tom Ridge in 1995, the Land Recycling Program
consists of three main statutes. As a voluntary clean-up program, it encourages the recycling and
redevelopment of old industrial sites into productive economic use. It protects human health and
the environment by setting standards for clean-up, while considering future use. 65 Potential
developers enjoy the benefits of clearly stated clean-up standards based on risk. The program
provides incentives in the form of grants and loans to encourage businesses to redevelop
brownfields. 66 It protects lenders associated with redevelopment by ending their liability when
the clean up standard is achieved and upon ownership of the land. Among its many benefits, the
Land Recycling Program has led to key partnerships between local government and business that
save the taxpayers millions of dollars in clean-up costs, making contaminated sites safe based on
sound science, and preserving farmland and green space. 67

The first act, entitled the Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act
(35 P. S. §§ 6026.101--6026.909) (LRA), (Act 2), is the primary law which the program is
based. 68 It provides a set of environmental remediation standards and standardized review
procedures to promote the voluntary elimination of public health and environmental hazards.
The clean-up plans must take into account the actual risk that contamination on a site may pose
to public health and the environment. 69 It allows the choice between four cleanup standards:
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background, statewide health, site-specific and special industrial areas. 70 The background
standard requires the remediator to demonstrate that the contamination onsite is not related to
any release of contaminants at the site itself. 71 Any contamination in soil and groundwater must
be statistically demonstrated to be present on the site and off the site. 72

The statewide health standard requires remediation of contaminants in soil and
groundwater to meet statewide health or non-use aquifer standards. 73 A special 13-member
Cleanup Standards Scientific Advisory Board set standards based on the range of excess cancer
risk of between one in 10,000 and one in 1 million. 74 Remediation plans may require excavation
and disposal of soil and extensive groundwater monitoring. 75 Volunteers may elect to meet either
residential or nonresidential cleanup standards. Volunteers remediating the site to nonresidential
standards are required to record a deed notice (notice of informal investigation). 76

The third remediation option is the site-specific health standard. This standard allows for
clean-up levels to be developed for a specific site. This may involve a detailed risk assessment
based on conditions and human exposures at the site to achieve a specific solution for remedy. 77
For suspected carcinogens, soil and groundwater clean-up standards must meet specific exposure
factors. Some toxicants must meet certain statistical standards, which represent levels to which
daily human exposure could occur without the risk of harmful effects. 78 The ecological impacts
of the remediation plan must also be evaluated. Often, the community is actively involved in
each step of this clean-up process at the request of the local municipality. 79

The fourth standard for clean-up that can be utilized is the Special Industrial Areas.
These include properties used for industrial purposes where there is no financially responsible
party to clean-up the contamination. 80 These sites are often abandoned or are located in
enterprise zones. In these cases, a person not responsible for causing or contributing to the
contamination may obtain liability protection by entering into an agreement with the Department
of Environmental Protection (DEP). 81 The innocent purchaser must submit a baseline
environmental report with proposed remedial measures to the DEP and allow for a 90-day review
period. 82 Based on that report, the innocent purchaser and the DEP and redeveloper must address
immediate, direct, and imminent threats to public health and the environment. 83
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All clean-up standards require a degree of public involvement. The developer must
submit a notice of intent to remediate and in some cases a submission of a final report
demonstrating the attainment of the specific standard, to DEP and the local municipality, which
must also be published in a local paper. 84

Act 2 offers clean-up liability protection to all persons participating in the remediation as
well as to future site owners and occupiers. The owner or developer of a site is relieved of
liability once the site has been remediated according to the above standards and procedures. The
owner or developer of a special industrial area has limited liability and is only responsible for
immediate threats, and not the remediation of any other contamination. 85 The liability protection
also does not apply to future contamination of the site. 86

The Industrial Sites Clean-up fund is established through Act 2 and is designed to
provide financial assistance to innocent persons to conduct voluntary cleanups. The Department
of Commerce administers the program and grants and low-interest loans are provided to cover up
to 75 percent of the cost of completing an environmental study and implementing a cleanup
plan. 87

The Economic Development Agency, Lender, and Fiduciary Environmental Protection
Act (Act 3) extend liability protection to financiers, such as economic development agencies,
lenders, and fiduciaries. 88 Banks and other lenders may be reluctant to provide services to
persons with environmental problems because of the risk of environmental liability and
remediation costs for conditions and contamination that were not caused by the lender. Under
Act 3, lenders can only be liable if they directly cause an immediate release or directly
exacerbate a release of regulated substances or knowingly compel a borrower to violate an
environmental law. 89 Liability is limited to the costs directly attributable to the lender’s actions.
In other words, even if a lender becomes liable, its liability is intended to be very limited. In
order to stimulate economic growth it is necessary to provide protection to the financier.
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The Industrial Sites Environmental Assessment Act (Act 4) expands the provisions of Act
2 and allows the Department of Commerce to make grants to municipalities or nonprofit
economic development agencies. 90 These grants are to be used for environmental assessments of
industrial sites located in distressed communities. Certain cities may also be eligible for grants
to conduct environmental assessments and cleanup activities. Funds may be used for the removal
and remediation of hazardous substances. All applicants must not have caused or contributed to
the contamination of the site. The state of Pennsylvania has designated $17 million in financial
aid for LRP programs participants. 91 Up to $2 million per year is transferred to this fund from
the Hazardous Wastes Cleanup Fund. 92

A. Pennsylvania’s Land Recycling Program Accomplishments

The Pennsylvania Land Recycling Program (PA LRP) boasts of having one of the best
brownfield programs in the country. According to the Pennsylvania DEP website, 2,498 sites
have been approved for clean-up by the Department and completed remediation procedure. 93 A
majority of the sites have been cleaned to statewide-health standards. There are 1,842 sites
currently waiting approval. 94 The success of the program can be attributed to several reasons.
First, it establishes clear and concise options for cleanup and risk assessment. Second, there is an
elimination of many adversarial enforcement actions and delays in clean-up plans. Third, the
loan application process is user friendly and there is a usually a rapid assessment and approval of
loans (7 calendar days in some cases). 95 Finally, the Pennsylvania Land Recycling Act requires
an element of public participation and community support. It requires the developer to “develop
and implement” a public involvement plan (PIP) if the municipality requests to be involved. The
established requirements relate to public notice, public comment, hearings, meetings, document
availability, and grants to citizen groups. The public notice is followed by a 90-day comment
period. 96 A public hearing is held within the 90-day comment period.

When Governor Ed Rendell took office in 2003 he promoted an ambitious plan to
accelerate redevelopment projects and give investors the certainty, confidence, and incentives
they needed to clean up brownfield properties and return them to productive use. 97 A recent
report prepared by the state government revealed that over the last three years, Governor Rendell
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invested almost $230 million in Pennsylvania’s brownfields redevelopment program, cleaning
roughly 950 abandoned industrial sites covering more than 6,000 acres, while creating or
retaining 27,000 jobs. 98 The PA Revitalization report states that under PA’s LRP, the state has
cleaned up over 2,194 contaminated and abandoned industrial sites (As of April, 2007 the
number has increased to 2,498). 99 Approximately, 40 percent of cleared sites have been
completed since 2003. 100

The report continues by stating that the Government and the Legislature have
collaborated to enact one of the largest economic stimulus packages in the country—a $2.8
billion package of venture capital, loans, and grants designed to create and retain jobs, ignite
business growth, and sustain communities. 101 To increase the speed of redevelopment projects
and give investors confidence, Governor Rendell launched the Brownfield Action Team (BAT)
in 2004. BAT serves as a single point-of-contact system to streamline permitting processes and
redevelopment efforts for those sites that local officials target as redevelopment priorities.102
The BAT works closely with other state agencies to provided one-stop shopping for cleanup and
financing strategies, based on the proposed use of the site and benefits to the surrounding area.
BAT projects typically get completed in half the usual time. 103 Since its inception in 2004, BAT
has assisted with 33 projects in 22 counties to redevelop more than 4,500 acres of brownfields. 104
The Pennsylvania Land Recycling Program deserves to be commended for protecting human
health, cleaning the environment, reducing the expense to taxpayers, promoting volunteerism,
and saving farmland and green space from future development.

B. Demand for Brownfields and Alternatives to Economic Reuse

Despite the reduction in uncertainty through legislation of the basic statutes, increased financial
incentives by public subsidy, and technical assistance, successful remediation of a brownfield
site may not produce a profitable investment outcome. Researchers Peters and Fisher (2004)
found that brownfields located in socially or economically depressed areas often present
challenges that are not overcome by incentives alone. Through their research in enterprise zones,
they concluded that the effect of incentives were “essentially inconsequential in all but a few
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cases” and suggest that the negative characteristics of a site cannot be overcome by incentives
alone. 105

In a report prepared by the Great Lakes Environmental Finance Center (GLEFC) at
Cleveland State University, researchers tried to determine the balance between demand for and
supply of brownfields in four Great Lake Cities. Researchers found that three of the four cities
“contained [a supply of] three to ten decades worth of central city brownfield properties relative
to annual nonresidential real estate demand, even with improved voluntary cleanup programs in
the states.” 106 Other research suggests that some brownfields are economically obsolete;
regardless of how clean the site is, unless a substantial amount is invested in improving
infrastructure (roads, sewers) or assembling parcels of land into marketable sites. 107 Depending
on one’s scope of the definition, it can be estimated that almost half of all existing brownfields
may be best suited for long-term interim uses (i.e. community gardens) or for permanent open
space, parkland, or buffer zones. 108 The opportunity to transform these lots into community
green spaces or community gardens is often a sensible short-term solution with long-term
benefits to the surrounding community. Brownfields redevelopment can be a time-consuming
process of identifying, assessing, negotiating, cleaning, litigating, and constructing new
infrastructure on a site. Redeveloping a brownfield may take several years to complete. In some
cases, longer periods of time are needed for larger and more severely contaminated sites. What
happens to the sites and the surrounding community in the interim period? The quicker vacant
land and brownfields are put back into productive use, the less likely the contagion of
abandonment will spread. 109 In addition, green spaces in the city may provide opportunities for
exercise and recreation or relief from traffic and noise. On a broader scale, green spaces, trees,
and gardens filter air and water, absorb storm runoff, provide shade, moderate temperatures, and
can even reduce crime rates. 110 Perhaps, city officials need to recognize this reality and rezone
brownfield sites to accommodate these less-intensive uses.

In Philadelphia, non-profit organizations have been active in promoting the reuse of
vacant land through community gardening and neighborhood greening. The foremost of these
organizations is the Pennsylvania Horticultural Society (PHS) and its Philadelphia Green
program. Since the mid-1970’s, the Society has introduced the concept of greening as a
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significant tool for community revitalization. One of the first objectives of Philadelphia Green
was to reclaim vacant land. In the New Kensington neighborhood, Philadelphia Green partnered
with the New Kensington Community Development Corporation and the city’s Office of
Housing and Community Development to create a vacant land management system. 111 Through
the employment of the basic “clean and green” method, tree plantings, and the transfer of vacant
lots to adjacent homeowners as private ‘side yards,’ the land management program has been
hugely successful. Now in its tenth year, over 60% of the community’s 1,100 vacant lots have
been improved—as community gardens, side yards for adjacent homeowners, and basic “clean
and green” lots planted with grass and trees. 112 At the federally funded American Street
Empowerment Zone in North Philadelphia, Philadelphia Green has worked with community
based organizations to transform over 55 abandoned lots filled with mounds of trash and debris
into “clean and green” lots. 113

Neighborhood greening and community gardens are effective tools in brownfield
redevelopment and vacant land reuse on three critical levels. They have positive impact on the
environmental, social/cultural, and economic status of a community. They are important in
improving the physical appearance and health of the urban environment, fostering social values
and preserving cultural heritage, and improving the economic well being of the community. 114
Neighborhood greening preserves the environment by cleaning up debris and trash and replacing
it with new trees, grass, shrubs, and flowers. 115 Community gardens encourage the cultivation of
vegetables and other plants that provide healthful food for low-income people. Greening and
gardening help to foster communities’ social and cultural values by encouraging social
interaction and creating neighborhood pride. 116 This renewed sense of community pride
increases neighborhood awareness, which has been shown to decrease drug activity and crime
rates. Gardens also bring people together across racial and socioeconomic boundaries. Lastly,
greening and gardening have a positive impact on the economy of local communities by
establishing food security, increasing real-estate values, and encouraging employment through
job-training opportunities. 117
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V. The Existence of Brownfields in Philadelphia
A. The City’s Industrial Heritage
Large urban industrial areas have been especially affected by the dilemma of abandoned land. In
the first half of the 20th century, Philadelphia was indeed an industrial powerhouse. It led the
nation in production of hosiery and knit goods, carpets and rugs, fur-felt hats, locomotives, dyed
and finished textiles, upholstery materials, streetcars, oilcloth and linoleum, sporting goods,
saws, and surgical appliances and artificial limbs. 118 It represented 211 of the 264 different
classifications of industry as determined by the Bureau of the Census. 119 After completing a
study of industrial life in England, Germany, and the Unites States in the early 1900’s, the
Englishman Arthur Shadwell, concluded that Philadelphia was “the greatest manufacturing city
in the world.” 120

In 1909, Philadelphia was the largest manufacturer of textiles in the entire world, and one
third of all wage earners in the city worked in some area of the field.” 121 By 1992, employment
in the textile and apparel industry had shrunk to a tiny thirteen thousand, or two percent of the
city’s total employment. Given the trend of that decade, where 88,000 manufacturing jobs, or
two out every five, were lost; it became clear that the trend would only continue. 122 The
industrial giants—Baldwin Locomotive, Cramp and Sons Steam Ship Yards, Stetson Hats, Henry
Disston’s Saw Manufactory, Excelsior Brick Works, J.B. Lippincott and Company, Sovereign
Oil—were all closed for business, leaving behind shuttered factories, decaying infrastructure,
and poisoned land. 123 As Buzz Bissinger keenly stated in his book, A Prayer for the City, “The
Workshop of the World had become the Manufacturing Mausoleum of the World.” 124 In 2000,
Philadelphia’s City Planning Commission found more than 31,000 vacant lots—double the
figure of 1990—and about 25,000 vacant structures. 125 If all of this vacant land were
concentrated into one area, it would be the size of downtown Philadelphia.
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B. Philadelphia’s Brownfield Program

While the states hold regulatory authority over the policies of a brownfield program, it is the
local government that often manages the redevelopment of specific brownfield sites.126 Local
government departments of economic development and planning typically direct local
brownfield programs and are ultimately responsible for their implementation. Most local
governments embrace brownfield revitalization as a practical tool for urban redevelopment
because it gives them the perfect opportunity to return blighted industrial sites to productive
reuse while improving the environment and creating hope for many depressed communities
surrounding these sites. 127

In Philadelphia, the Department of Commerce is the primary organization for all
economic development in the city. 128 Its objectives are to stimulate and facilitate economic
improvement in all neighborhoods of the city. It collaborates with delegated agencies such as the
Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and the Redevelopment Authority
(RDA) to incorporate development strategies. The Department of Commerce’s website declares
that “its business development strategies help both small businesses and major corporations
thrive.” 129

Among its other duties, the Commerce Department administers federal and state business
incentive programs, provides loans, and provides site selection and land acquisition services to
any companies that are interested in relocating or expanding into the Philadelphia market. Its
federal duties include the administration of the federal empowerment zone program, which
provides qualified businesses in certain designated areas with low-interest financing, federal
wage tax credits, and tax-exempt facility bonds. 130 For the state, it administers the Keystone
Opportunity Zone state program (KOZs) that provides tax exemption from all or most state and
local business, real estate, and occupancy taxes for companies that locate in any of these
designated areas. These tax abatements are conditional on firms increasing full-time jobs in the
first year of operations or making significant capital investments in property within the zone. 131
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Located in the Department of Commerce is the city’s brownfield program. Its objective is
to provide financial and technical assistance to developers with interest in redeveloping land with
potential environmental liability. In an interview, Jon Edelstein, Industrial Reuse Manager in the
Department, asserted that the driving force of the brownfield program in Philadelphia is
economic development not environmental concerns. 132 The local program focuses on industrial
land reuse and with an emphasis on large parcels of land on the waterfront. 133 The size and
location of the parcel contribute to its market potential, thus are critical factors in attracting
developers to an area for redevelopment. Generally, brownfield sites in Philadelphia do not sit
vacant because of environmental contamination. 134 In fact, they present more marketing issues
than liability issues. 135 The sale of brownfields, like most other real estate, is a market-driven
process. According to Mr. Edelstein, large pieces of industrial land sell themselves. 136 A large
percentage of Philadelphia’s brownfields are too small, poorly configured, poorly located, or
away from strategic economic zones, to attract serious private investment interest. 137

One objective of Mayor John Street’s Neighborhood Transformation Initiative (NTI) is to
clear and acquire smaller parcels of land and to assemble them into larger tracts that will be more
suitable for developers’ plans. Mr. Edelstein claims that one of the largest barriers to the runaway success of the local brownfield programs is the lack of inventory of large industrial sites. 138
PIDC claims they are at a 30-year low in inventory of sites that have the potential (adequate size,
location, and configuration) to be invested in by a private developer. 139 To encourage
investment and redevelopment, the City often “writes-down” a property—selling a property for
less than market value. 140 Historically, Philadelphia has been behind the real-estate curve. The
recent real estate boom over the last seven years has only brought the city up to par with many of
the other larger cities in the nation. Currently, the real-estate market has reached a plateau where
prices are not going up or down. 141

According to Mayor John Street’s “Economic Development Blueprint for Greater
Philadelphia,” one of the major objectives is to continue the successful development of
Philadelphia’s 38 miles of waterfront. 142 In furtherance with this vision, the current objective of
the city’s local brownfield program is to focus on aggressively marketing the sites that fit within
the parameters of Philadelphia’s New River City Project. 143 The goal of the Project is to reclaim
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the rivers in Philadelphia by stimulating economic interest in developing along their shores,
providing public access to their banks, and planning for a more sustainable and livable
environment for the city’s residents and visitors alike. 144 Both the Northern Delaware River and
the Southern Schuylkill River are targeted for large redevelopment projects.

Lower Schuylkill River: The development plan includes a partnership with the Schuylkill River
Development Corporation (SRDC) along with other stakeholders such as the University of
Pennsylvania, Drexel University, Brandywine Realty Trust, and Amtrak. The SRDC Master Plan
for the site incorporates the Schuylkill River Park and Trail, 700,000 square foot Cira Centre
office tower, and redevelopment plans for the Civic Center and Post Office sites. 145

North Delaware: The plan includes redevelopment of eleven miles of riverfront zone north of the
Betsy Ross Bridge. The Master plan was prepared by the Philadelphia City Planning
Commission (PCPC). Its central vision is to convert 3,500 acres of decaying industrial land to
residential, recreational, and commercial uses at a total cost of $1.5 billion. 146 Public funding for
remediation and trail/roads/parks is in the process of being reviewed. Brownfield reclamation is
underway on several major sites along this section and private developers are moving ahead with
at least three important residential projects. 147

Central Delaware: A market-driven residential and retail development is underway along the
Delaware River from Port Richmond to Packer Ave. The city is reviewing several bids for
possible casino locations along this section. 148

The City Council would like to support the proposed redevelopment strategies by
pursuing with PIDC’s mixed-use Master Plan, continuing to support SRDC’s Master Plan,
cooperate with PCPC’s Master Plan. 149 Furthermore, it plans to coordinate development of the
Central Delaware as a residential, commercial, and entertainment destination. The Council has
committed $125 million to appropriate New River City infrastructure which will leverage
maximum private and other pubic funding. 150 The city will continue its responsibilities of
planning, land assemblage, environmental remediation, demolition, and infrastructure
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investment. This will create opportunities for private developers to commit significantly to
greater levels of capital necessary in anticipation of market rate returns. 151

Projected outcomes of the Philadelphia’s New River City Project over the next three
years include approximately 750,000 sq ft. of office space, 2,500 new jobs, 650 residential units,
and with a total investment of $250 million. 152 The city estimates that public investment costs
will be $30 million, primarily for street, open space, and utility upgrades. 153

On February 23, 2006, Governor Rendell announced his endorsement of Philadelphia’s
New River City Project by designating the Schuylkill and Delaware River sections of the project
eligible for Brownfield Action Team assistance. Environmental Protection Secretary Kathleen
McGinty presented a $400,000 grant to the Schuylkill River Development Corp., to help create a
14-foot wide asphalt recreation trail along the section of the east bank of the river in the 34th
Street/Grays Ferry Avenue area. The trail would provide recreational riverfront access that it
previously lacked. The non-profit entity will use the funding to conduct environmental
assessments and remediation on the land where the trail will be located. The funding is derived
from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfield Revitalization Act which provides money for states to pay for assessments and cleanups. Pennsylvania has received about $1 million from EPA in each of the last three fiscal
years. 154

The funding for the Philadelphia’s brownfield program is mostly funded through the
Hazardous Sites Clean-up Act (HSCA) that has recently been replenished by Growing Greener 1
& 2, largely supported by Governor Rendell. The Department of Commerce has received $1.5
million from the state and $200,000 from the EPA to facilitate the local brownfield program and
encourage future development. 155

In 2004, an Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed by the Environmental
Protection Secretary (on behalf of Gov. Rendell) in conjunction with the EPA that made PA
LRP’s the first in the nation to serve as a one-stop shop for state and federal standards guiding
the brownfield redevelopment. Sites that are remediated under the state’s brownfield program
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now also may satisfy requirements for three federal laws: RCRA, CERCLA, and TSCA. The
MOA sets a clear path for developers to address both federal and state remediation
obligations. 156

Several local investors and development corporations sung the MOA’s praise. “The
Philadelphia Naval Yard has become a terrific asset for economic development in Philadelphia,
and today’s announcement provided even greater incentive for companies to re-use former
industrial sites like the Navy Yard rather than looking to greenfields elsewhere,” said Peter
Longstreth of the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation. 157

VI. Philadelphia Naval Yard: A Grand Vision of Mixed-Use Redevelopment
The property lies 3.5 miles south of City Hall at the foot of the historic Broad Street axis. The
1000-acre former Navy base, comparable to the size of Center City, contains an active shipyard
west of Broad Street, six miles of waterfront along the Schuylkill and Delaware River Estuaries,
and over 187 historic buildings in the National Registered Philadelphia Naval Shipyard Historic
District. 158 A public-private partnership of the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation
(PIDC) and Liberty Property Trust/Synterra Partners with assistance from Robert A.M. Stern
Architects issued a Master Plan in 2004 to guide the redevelopment of the 522 acres east of
Broad Street. The master plan for the Navy Yard envisions a vibrant mixed use community of
office, residential, institutional, cultural, research and development, retail, and recreation uses. 159
The plan capitalizes on the property’s unique assets, which include the site’s enormous size, its
location at the center of the region’s transportation networks and labor force, a historic district
with extraordinary turn-of-the century architecture and landscape, its more than several miles of
frontage along the Delaware River, and its proximity to the cultural amenities of the region. The
plan also addressed the site’s several constraints including limited road connection from Center
City, no direct mass-transit connection, large areas susceptible to flooding, soils with lowbearing capacity, and a residential deed restriction. 160

22

A. Site History

The Philadelphia Naval Shipyard officially opened in the city’s Southwark District in 1801.
Seventy-five years later the yard moved three miles south to its current location in the southern
part of the city. The tidal water of the Schuylkill and Delaware River Estuaries protected the iron
ships from rust, and its inland position, ninety-five miles from the place where the Delaware Bay
meets the Atlantic Ocean, offered it protection against attack. 161 The steel and iron needed to
build the new ships were close at hand as well as an inexhaustible supply of skilled labor.
Several of the Navy’s non-nuclear aircraft carriers were either built there or overhauled and
modernized. In 1970, the yard built its last ship from the keel up, the 18,646-ton USS Blue
Ridge. 162 By the 1990’s, the Philadelphia Naval Yard was home to a number of rusting ships and
an unknown amount of dangerous chemicals from past industrial uses. Its streets were nearly
deserted, it dry docks empty, and its cranes at a standstill. Still, the shipyard held considerable
value. The complex contained over 1,000 buildings, 52 miles of streets, and six miles of
waterfront in the southernmost point of Philadelphia. A 1999 appraisal of the property,
commissioned by the Navy, concluded that the shipyard had an estimated fair market value of
$56.6 billion. 163 However, decommissioning and cleaning the contaminated property for
suitable reuse would not be cheap. The U.S. Navy reported that it spent almost $300 million
over five years, including $88 million for the environmental clean up of the property. 164 The
historical use of the site was primary shipbuilding, but it was also used as a landfill and had an
incinerator on it at one point. This left behind various chemicals such as heavy metals and lead.
The condition of the site upon acquisition presented very little public access opportunities.
Preliminary geotechnical assessment also revealed that much of the site lies below the 100-year
flood plain and has relatively poor soil conditions. 165

B. Role of Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation

As a response to the federal Base Closure and Realignment Commission of the early 1990’s, the
Navy officially decommissioned its Naval Shipyard and Naval Station in 1996 and 1998. 166
This opened up an opportunity for the redevelopment of the site. During the transition, in 1994
the City of Philadelphia’s Mayor’s Commission on Defense Conversion published a Community
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Reuse Plan that outlined a vision that would guide the redevelopment process for almost a
decade. 167 In 2000, the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) accepted
ownership of the 1000 acre property from the U.S. Department of Defense (Navy). 168

The PIDC is a private, not-for-profit corporation, mostly composed of members from the
Chamber of Commerce and the Commerce Department, created to promote economic
development and job creation throughout the city. It provides financing programs and real estate
resources to businesses and developers to retain and promote employment growth in
Philadelphia. 169 The PIDC also coordinates tax incentives and employment programs offered by
the City and the State.

According to its 2005 annual report, PIDC has reclaimed over 1800 acres of industrial
and commercial land in Philadelphia since its inception in 1958. Since that same time, PIDC
boasts of creating over 430,000 jobs in Philadelphia. 170 It has settled 5,100 transactions
including $7.4 billion of financing and five million square feet of leased space. 171 These
impressive achievements have leveraged over $13 billion in total project investment. 172

C. Major Incentives for Acquisition

In an interview, PIDC’s John Grady, Senior Vice President of Real Estate, revealed that the most
attractive attributes of the Naval Yard property were its unique real estate assets, physical scale,
and the long-term investment opportunity it represented. With 2.5 miles of shoreline within the
future redevelopment plan area, it is a premier waterfront property. Views across the estuary
from the Navy Yard are of green New Jersey shoreline, with the exception of one oil refinery.
Streets from within the site that run perpendicular to the river often allow river views from deep
within the site. The Delaware Estuary is over 1.5 miles wide at this point, allowing for a broad
area for recreational boating. Looking due north from the Navy Yard, one can see expansive
views of the sports stadium and city skyline. 173

The ramps to I-95 at the Navy Yard entrance provide direct highway access routes to
New York City and Washington D.C., and to most areas of the immediate Philadelphia and
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Southern New Jersey region. The Navy Yard is highly visible from the I-95 as it passes the site,
providing an opportunity for public recognition. The scale of the site is comparable in size to
Center City Philadelphia. 174 It has the capacity to contain several neighborhoods and with a
good mix of use. Mr. Grady also claimed that the site of offers a unique opportunity for the
PIDC to invest in its operational infrastructure. Most of the public infrastructure on the site is
maintained by the PIDC, not the city. 175

Aside from its unique geographic location, the site lies in an area that makes it favorable
for future economic development. Certain sections of the property are designated Keystone
Opportunity Zones (KOZs) that would provide tax relief from most city and state business and
real estate taxes for its employees and residents. The site is eligible for the tax relief up until
2018 under the conditions that it demonstrates job growth and attracts new businesses. 176 In
March 2005, the Commonwealth designated the Navy Yard as a Keystone Innovation Zone
(KIZ). 177 This designation gives the site and companies who move there access to a wide range
of state incentives for technology development. The Navy Yard is also a nationally certified
historic district on the National Register of Historic Places. As a result, investment tax credits of
up to 20% of renovation costs may be available for qualified building restorations. 178

Another incentive for acquisition for the PIDC was a unique form of liability relief
presented by the EPA. In the acquisition agreement of the property from the Navy, the EPA
assured PIDC that the Navy had accepted full responsibility for the site contamination, even if
the property is leased, sub-leased, or resold. 179 This guarantees that the EPA will not take
enforcement action or require clean-up reparations for future lessees or successors. One of the
first private investors to see value in the property at the Navy Yard was Kvaerner, a Norwegian
shipbuilding company who was looking to expand its operations. In 1997, it signed a 99-year
lease for a portion of the property and pledged to invest $600 million in renovation and
modernization of the Navy Yard. 180 As part of the deal, Kvaerner was assured in a “closure
letter” from the federal, state, and local government that it would not be responsible for any preexisting conditions. 181 Another factor in Kvaerner’s agreement was a tailored environmental risk
insurance policy from the PIDC, providing $40 million in liability limits that includes coverage
against third-party claims resulting form sudden or gradual pollution conditions, clean-up costs
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and legal claims for a five-year period. 182 The policy also provided Kvaerner with a business
interruption expense protection, which may arise from unknown pollution conditions. 183 For
many businesses that choose to deal with unknown contamination on a site, the purchase of a
good environmental insurance policy is an effective strategy in controlling expenses and assuring
timely completion of a redevelopment project. 184

D. Remediation and Technical Assistance

The Naval Yard brownfield redevelopment project demands careful planning concerning a
variety of technical issues including environmental impacts and utility infrastructure
requirements. Many of the buildings at the complex were designed for industrial use, either for
research or shipbuilding activities. Much of the contamination on the site was related to the
construction and repair of ships. Among the exposures were contamination from gasoline
stations operated on-site, fuel tanks, metals, and PCBs and asbestos used in the transformers. 185
Various hazardous organic and inorganic chemicals were stored and used in the power plant,
electroplating, paint shop, and foundry operations. 186 Environmental assessment and cleanup
began in 1991 to prepare the property for transfer or lease. Much of the information regarding
the Navy’s remediation procedures in preparation for its transfer to the public domain is not
public information. Once the site was acquired by the PIDC, the remediation process focused on
asbestos abatement in the buildings, PCB impacted soil removal, and underground storage tank
removal. 187 Much of the contaminated soil and “plasting grit” was removed off the site.
Groundwater restrictions were put into place and all potable water on the complex is supplied by
the City of Philadelphia. 188 Due to the past dense development on the site, much of the utility
infrastructure is already in place (water, electricity, gas, communication, and storm and sewer).
However, that infrastructure needed to be modernized and expanded to support future
development. In 2004, PENNVEST, a state agency that funds stormwater and drinking water
projects, approved a $1,750,013 loan to the Philadelphia Authority for Industrial Development to
construct drinking water distribution lines, sanitary sewer collection lines and storm water
facilities to eliminate soil and groundwater contamination on 4.5 acres of the 70-acre corporate
campus at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. 189 In addition, PA DEP approved an $18,308,000 loan to
the Philadelphia Authority for Industrial Development to develop an 82-acre portion of the
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Historic Core at the Navy Yard known as the Town Center. 190 During 2003-2006, PA DEP
awarded $516,454 in funds to the Philadelphia Authority for Industrial Development for the
removal and disposal of asbestos and lead-based paint at two former machine shop sites at the
Navy Yard. 191 The redevelopment of the particular site was selected as a Brownfield Action
Team Project by the PA DEP.

Floodplain issues are also of concern across most of the Navy Yard site. As part of the
industrial and commercial revitalization and remediation plans of the Philadelphia-Camden
waterfront, PIDC contracted Weston Solutions for engineering and technical assistance. They
conducted a feasibility assessment examining the geotechnical conditions and the chemical and
physical properties of dredged properties. The land on the eastern end of the site consists of fill
placed in the Delaware River in the earlier years of the Navy Yard. Below the fill is a highly
compressible alluvial soil layer. 192 This may necessitate the use of deep foundation systems
including piles and slurry walls. Because most of the site lies within the 100-year floodplain, the
consultants recommended an implementation plan for placing 3.8 million cubic yards of dredged
materials from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Delaware River Deepening Project to raise the
elevation of the site above the 100-year floodplain. 193 PIDC also commissioned the firm to
conduct ecological studies, cultural resource assessment and hazardous material investigation. 194

E. The Master Plan

The Master Plan, envisioned and prepared by the PIDC, Liberty/ Synterra Properties, Robert
A.M. Stern Architects, and Mayor Street, among others, divides the Naval Yard into five major
districts: Historic Core, Corporate Center, Research Park, Marina District, and the East End. 195
The primary objectives of the Master Plan are to:
•

Design the site as urban mixed-use that will have around-the-clock activity

•

Capitalize on the historical building and landscape assets

•

Set a high standard for environmental sustainability through “green” planning and
building practices

•

Open as much waterfront as possible for convenient public access

•

Provide for a integrated open space system
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•

Establish a clear network of roads and a plan for better connectivity to mass transit 196

The mixed uses proposed for the site include office, retail, research and development, and
light industrial. The plan also proposes to include rental and ownership occupied residential
development. However, there is currently a deed restriction that prevents this type of
development. The PIDC is working on voiding the restriction, and soon hopes to begin to
rehabilitate existing buildings in the historic core into rental apartments. 197 The goal of
encouraging mixed-use on the property is intended to promote more rapid development at the
Navy Yard than any single use would normally provide. 198 This will also encourage around-theclock activity that will maximize the use of the site. The proposal also offers focal points that
will define the image and character of both the Navy Yard as a whole and each district. A
proposed marina will be “an active and physical destination, a symbolic reference to The Navy
Yard’s history, and a point of contact between the city, its people, and its waterfront.” 199 New
streets are also proposed to complete traffic patterns within the site. Most significant is the
proposed Diagonal Boulevard that will be the main street for the Corporate Center and an
organizing element for the central portion of the Navy Yard. 200
Sustainable development is a central premise of the 2004 Naval Yard plan. 201 The
medium-to high-density development proposed by the plan reduces the land consumption as
compared to typical low-density suburban development. Mixed-use also reduces automobile
traffic when it replaces single-use development. The site is home to 27 acres of wetlands that can
provide natural habitat for wildlife, as well as two miles of waterfront that could be opened up to
public access. 202 Proposed open spaces will be linked by greenway streets, pedestrian routes,
and bicycle paths. The plan design also incorporates ‘bioswales’ in the parking lots for
stormwater retention and filtering purposes. 203 Newly constructed buildings will have a
sustainable design meeting the standard of LEED certification. 204 New construction will address
energy use, waste product recycling, use of renewable resources, and will be transit-oriented.
Mass transit plans for the site include bus connections from the Broad St. subway and a one-mile
extension of the SEPTA Broad Street Line. 205 A projected $260 million investment would be
necessary to meet these transit goals. 206
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F. Public Subsidies and Private Investment

John Grady stated that the PIDC had received federal grants from the Economic Development
Agency in the amounts of approximately $5 million for demolition and $2 million for road
construction on the site. 207 In total, Mr. Grady estimates receiving $30 million in federal funding
for infrastructure (utilities, roads, demolition) investment. 208 It also received a $50 million grant
from the federal government to establish a revolving loan fund. 209 Last, the Aker Shipyard
project received a large federal grant associated with job training. The state has invested about
$20 million in infrastructure grants. They also made a significant contribution to the
development of the Aker project. On the local level, the city has contributed about $10 million
to date in capital funding for infrastructure and planning. The PIDC itself has contributed about
$20 million of funds from the federal revolving loan fund and the proceeds from its leasing and
development activity. 210 In addition, PIDC is in charge of funding roads and mass transit into
property. For the 522 acres proposed for development in the master plan, the PIDC estimates
about $150 million in total infrastructure investment required. 211 The proposed investment in
infrastructure is capable of leveraging significant private investment. Depending on the
development scenario implemented, total private investment for the Navy Yard can range from
$1.4 billion to $2.2 billion. 212

Several years after the acquisition of the property, the PIDC solicited for proposals from
local developers to encourage private investment on the site. In 2002, it entered into an
agreement with Liberty Property Trust and Synterra Partners as master developers for a 72-acre
portion lying adjacent to the property gateway. 213 PIDC provided Liberty Properties with a $7.2
million loan to fund some initial infrastructure and road construction within the property, but no
grants were given. 214 The Corporate Center core covers 72 acres at the gateway to The Navy
Yard. It will contain office buildings totaling approximately 1.4 million square feet of new
construction. 215 It will offer 110,000 square feet of potential retail. 216 The Class A office space
will be located in ten to twelve buildings, ranging from three to six stories in height. The
location of the Corporate Center is highly visible from the I-95 overpass and will serve as a
symbolic landmark for the entire Naval Yard renewal project. At an average rate of one
employee per 1,000 square feet of office space, the proposed office development within the
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Corporate Center will support 5,600 jobs. 217 The grand scale of the Navy Yard offers several
amenities of a suburban corporate campus including free parking. The Corporate Center is also
located within tax advantaged KOZ and KIZ areas. 218 Qualified companies locating within KOIZ
areas are exempt from most city and state business and real estate taxes for up to 15 years. i

The Navy Yard has been quite successful in shifting its economic base from an industrial
base to a corporate/research. Public investment in infrastructure and utilities have helped to
attract diverse employers like Kvaerner ASA (shipbuilding), Liberty Property Trust (real estate),
AppTec Laboratory Services (biotechnology), Barthco International, Inc. (shipping), Urban
Outfitters (retailing), and over fifty-five other private companies which employ over 6,000
people. 219 Liberty Property and Synterra’s first construction project on the site was a LEEDcertified Platinum green building called One Crescent Drive in the Corporate Center core. 220 In
2005, the implementation of the Navy Yard master plan continued as Kvaerna/Aker executed a
$1 billion contract to manufacture ten double tankers; Urban Outfitters occupied the first phase
of its $50 million corporate campus; and the $100 million produce and seafood terminal project
was sited at the far east of the property. 221 Vitetta, a Philadelphia-based architectural firm,
transformed the former marine barracks of 1901 into a state-of-the-art facility. 222

In 2006, Urban Outfitters retail stores completed the move of its Anthropologie division
and 620 employees to the Navy Yard into the newly renovated historic Building 543. 223 Liberty
Property Trust and Synterra Partners completed a construction on 46,000 square foot office
building in the Corporate Center home to Unique Industries’ new headquarters. 224 Unique
Industries is a Philadelphia-based manufacturer and distributor of entertainment supplies.
Liberty and Synterra also started construction on a new Data and Operations Center for the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange. 225 PIDC continued to improve the public infrastructure of the
Navy Yard, starting new construction on road project in the Historic Core and completing the
design for streetscape upgrades. 226

i

Keystone Opportunity Zones are defined areas with greatly reduced or no tax burden for property owners,
residents, and businesses (www.koz.newpa.com 2007). An area defined as a KOZ must display evidence of
“adverse economic and socioeconomic conditions such as high poverty rates, high unemployment rates, percentage
of abandoned or underutilized property, and/or population loss.” To be considered a KOZ, a strategy or vision
statement must be submitted to demonstrate how targeted growth could impact the surrounding community.
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In 2007, additional progress is expected in the construction of third office building in the
Corporate Center core. The Navy Yard Keystone Innovation Zone will continue to advance
private, government, and academic investment to establish a regional hub for research and
development of engineering sciences. 227 It is led by a partnership of the PIDC, Pennsylvania
State University, the U.S. Navy, Ben Franklin Technology Partners, Delaware Valley Industrial
Resource Center, and the City of Philadelphia. 228 Ben Franklin Technology will relocate its
headquarters from 1835 Market St. in Center City to Building 100, a 32,000-square-foot site at
the Navy Yard that used to be home to Marine Corps barracks. 229 Discussions have also begun
about the extension of the Broad Street subway and opportunities for residential development. 230

G. Public Involvement and Community Impact

Any base closure involves a community process. It was no different in this case when the Navy
transferred the base to PIDC. In 1994, a reuse plan was submitted and posted to the community.
According to Mr. Grady, there was little neighborhood resistance or pressure. 231 The site’s
design and location, well-removed from any immediate neighborhood, provided a buffer zone
from any disturbances from demolition and construction. It was seen that the office development
would counterbalance the residential neighborhood to the north. 232 One issue that arose was
PIDC’s desire to extend the Broad St. subway line to the Navy Yard complex. This would help
PIDC in accomplishing one of its primary goals for the complex: reintegrating the Navy Yard
into the fabric of the city. 233 This could be achieved most effectively by extending the subway
system and building roads into the complex. Additional community meetings would have to take
place before the implementation of a subway extension. 234

H. Lessons Learned

The redevelopment of the Philadelphia Navy Yard represents a cornerstone of the city’s
visionary New River City initiative. Successful completion of the Navy Yard project will require
extraordinary cooperation between the private and public sector (public-private partnership). All
stakeholders involved including the EPA, the city and state officials, PIDC, Liberty Trust
Properties/Synterra Partners, private retail outfitters, private business, the historical society,
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engineers, planners, landscape architects, and the local unions must work together in harmony if
the master plan is to become a success. The PIDC, as a non-profit entity, has the unique
leadership role of encouraging private investment into the plan and facilitating the entire
development process. Another key factor in financing the purchase was the indemnity provided
for by the Navy. This significantly reduced the risks for the PIDC, present lessees, and future
successors, while also put the lending institutions at ease. Also, the designation of select areas of
the site as Brownfield Action Team Projects will facilitate a more streamlined and efficient
remediation process.

The site’s good access, high visibility, and impressive size make it an excellent long term
investment opportunity. To obtain the best return on the investment, the PIDC must capitalize
on the site’s unique natural, historical, and regional assets. The several miles of waterfront and
existence of wetlands make the site a good natural habitat for wildlife. Recently, a bald eagle
pair has taken up residence in one of the trees along the river to raise their young. Making a
strong recovery on the endangered species list, the bald eagle pair is symbolic of the
revitalization of the 130-year old Navy Yard. The dry docks and multitude of historic buildings
on the site offer cultural significance and recreational opportunity. The regional access of the
site provided by I-95 is ideal for commuters. This may attract large businesses looking to
relocate their headquarters, which may bring thousands of job opportunities. Furthermore, the
strategic location of the Corporate Center in KOIZ areas will provide an incentive for corporate
relocation.

VII. Good Will Business Park: Sharing a Vision with a West Chester
Community
In 1998, Alliance Environmental Systems (AES) began looking for new place to locate its
headquarters. The demolition and environmental service company hoped to find a location in the
Chester County area. Its search ended when it stumbled across an 8.5 acre brownfields property
at 510 E. Union St. in West Chester, Pa. 235
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A. Site History
Historic records show that the parcel had been used for a variety of purposes since the late 19th
century. It was initially a brick clay quarry, and then served as a municipal landfill. In the early
1940’s, National Foam Systems used it as a landfill for its sulfate wastes. 236 Wyeth
Pharmaceuticals purchased the site in 1948 along with 30 other acres as the site for its
pharmaceutical manufacturing operations. 237 In 1984, Wyeth sold the site to Fermtec Products,
Inc. and manufactured pharmaceutical products on the site until 1991. 238 At that time,
manufacturing ceased and the site was only used as a storage and distribution center. In 1994,
Fermtec vacated and abandoned the site. 239

After over 60 years of its use for a variety of industrial and commercial purposes, the
site’s contamination had to be addressed by AES before it commenced the purchase. Records
showed that the groundwater was contaminated by methylene chloride, which Wyeth used in its
penicillin manufacturing process in the 1970s and 1980s. 240 Supposedly, Wyeth had worked
with the Pa Department of Environmental Protection to monitor and clean the groundwater and
storm water from the site. In addition, the site was also contaminated with other chemicals that
were disposed in the landfill previous to Wyeth’s occupation, before the government regulated
disposal of wastes. 241

After considering the historical uses of the site, AES believed that there probably was not
any contamination on the surface of the ground. It initially estimated that the clean-up of the site
would cost between $100,000-$300,000 under the Land Recycling Act (Act 2), which also would
provide liability protection to AES once attainment of cleanup standards have been
demonstrated. 242 It believed that if the site could be purchased at a reasonable cost then it would
be a worthwhile investment. 243

B. Remediation
Alliance Environmental Services purchased the 8.5 acre site for $100,000 in 1998. 244 Senya
Isayeff, senior partner of AES, admitted that the offer was very low, and ventured to believe it

33

was accepted because AES had a very high insurance policy and would not exacerbate the
present contamination on the site that would evoke retroactive liability to the original owner of
the site that may have been responsible for polluting it. 245 AES submitted a notice-of-intent to
remediate the site under Act 2 program in July of 1998. 246 It worked closely with the Southeast
office of the PA DEP to develop risk-based clean-up standards and remediation strategies for the
site. 247 The approved preliminary remediation plan called for taking a set of soil samples over a
three-month period. 248 The estimated cost was $150,000 and would give it a sense of the extent
of the existing contamination. 249 Based on the results, it could develop a final remediation plan.
A Notice of Intent to Remediate was submitted for the site to the DEP on January 29, 2001 and
the public notice of the submission was on December 17, 2000. 250 In June 2001, the Act 2 Final
Report and Addendum were submitted to the DEP in pursuant of Statewide Health Standards and
Background Standards for soil and groundwater contamination. Soil samples from various areas
on the site revealed quantities of Lead, Arsenic, and Cadmium and the consultants recommended
to be cleaned to Statewide Health Standards. 251 On January 28, 2002, DEP concluded that the
designated areas of the site had been cleaned accordingly and had achieved the Statewide Health
Standard. 252

C. Public Involvement

Once AES submitted its NIR plan to PA DEP, it had 30 days to inform the public. This can be
done by submitting postings in local newspapers or church bulletins and usually involves
arranging a meeting to which the community is invited to provide its input into the project.
Senya of AES stated that the community was generally open to redevelopment of the site. 253
After all, once the former owner abandoned the site it had quickly turned into a prominent blight
on the community. Some of the infrastructure on the site was pillaged for valuable metals
leaving an unsightly abandoned carcass of a building behind. 254 There was understandable
animosity in the community towards the new owners of the site (AES). The community, mostly
comprised of 68 low-income apartments immediately associated AES with the people
responsible for the present condition of the property. 255 Though not responsible for the pollution
and current condition of the site, Senya understood the mixed feelings of the community. He
stated, “Change is unknown- we had to embrace the community.” 256 It took two meetings over
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the period of two months before trust was established and the community began its constructive
criticism and input into the future development of the property. 257

D. Major Tax Incentives

By chance, AES received a newsletter from a local environmental consulting company outlining
a program sponsored by the EPA called the Federal Brownfields Tax Inventive. 258 At the time,
one requirement of the incentive was that the community surrounding the site had to meet a
specific socio-economic standard to be eligible for the tax break. AES soon discovered that the
8.5-acre site was in fact “located on a census tract with a 29.6% poverty rate, well above the 20%
poverty rate threshold set in the guidelines.” 259 AES quickly put together a comprehensive report
of the site and sent it to PA DEP and EPA. The submission was reviewed and approved within
seven calendar days. 260 AES was officially certified to use the Federal Brownfields Tax
Incentive.

As a general matter, federal tax law does not permit a company to deduct the cost of
remediation or demolition of a property in the income year that the expenditure occurs. 261 In the
past, most environmental remediation expenditures had to be capitalized over time, and could not
be fully deducted in the year incurred. 262 Under the Brownfields Tax Incentive, environmental
clean-up costs for properties remediated in select areas are fully deductible in the year in which
they were incurred, rather than having to be capitalized. On its website, the EPA asserts that the
$1.5 billion incentive is expected to leverage $6.0 billion in private investment and return an
estimated 14,000 brownfields to productive use. 263 AES estimated that the tax incentive provided
it with $800,000 in tax relief. 264

A few years ago, the incentive was on the verge of expiration because of its lack of
utilization by the public. 265 After becoming alert to this, Senya immediately started a letter
writing campaign in attempt to convince Congress to renew the invaluable incentive. 266
Fortunately, on December 20, 2006, President Bush signed the Tax Relief and Health Care Act
of 2006 which renewed the incentive until December 31, 2007. 267 In addition, the incentive now
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includes the deduction of expenses for the clean-up of petroleum products (crude oil, crude oil
condensates, and natural gasoline) which were previously ineligible. 268

AES also utilized local tax incentives for the redevelopment project. It used a municipal
tax extension in Chester County called the Local Economic Revitalization Tax Assistance
(LERTA), which offers three-year abatement for increased value in property taxes. 269 For three
years AES only had to pay taxes on the previously determined value of the property. 270 Senya
provided some tax figures to demonstrate the value of LERTA.

The Total County, School and Borough taxes for the entire property (8.5 acres) before the
clean-up and redevelopment: $1,489.00/year 271

2006 Total County, School, and Borough taxes for two parcels (4.5 acres) after the
expiration of LERTA: $68,160.00/year 272

Just for the two parcels of land that AES kept (other two were sold and are now tax-exempt) the
total taxes increased more than 45 times the original amount when the tax incentive expired.

In addition, AES took advantage of two state programs that offered assistance for
brownfield redevelopers in the form of liability relief. The first was the Pennsylvania Act 2
Program, which provides indemnity to the developer from liability issues; the second was the
Pennsylvania Act 3 Program, which provides indemnity from liability issues to lenders. 273

Senya Isayeff commends the incentives as a “get out there and do-it-yourself” program
that “allows small business owners to make a difference at minimum expense and maximum
efficiency.” 274 It sends a message to private investors that cleaning the environment can be a
bargain and profitable. “Were it not for the federal EPA/IRS Tax Incentive, the state Act 2
liability indemnification, and the local 3-year LERTA program, Senya states “we would not have
been able to clean-up the former pharmaceutical manufacturing facility, a brownfields site, and
develop Good Will Business Park, a job, income, and tax generating facility in the Borough of
West Chester.” 275

36

E. Development and Community Impact

From the beginning, Senya and his company had a vision of giving back to the community. They
wanted a portion of the site to be dedicated to mixed uses, both commercial and industrial
components. Two acres of the site were sold to the township for $300,000/acre for the
construction of a firehouse. 276 No property taxes are owed for that parcel in perpetuity of
township ownership. While this may have not been a financial benefit for the community, to
some a more important intangible benefit was gained. A 30% increase in volunteers was seen at
the new firehouse after construction was complete. 277 The new location of the site and improved
accommodations also reduced the response time to fires significantly. Subsequently, Senya went
as far as to say that PA Act 2 and the EPA have actually saved lives with their incentive
programs. 278 Residents were initially concerned with the noise and increased truck traffic on the
site. Upon the completion of construction though, it was an immediate success. Children from
the community loved the firehouse and often helped the firemen wash the trucks. 279 An
immeasurable sense of volunteerism was instilled in the community.
A second parcel was sold to a senior center for $2.86 million. 280 Soon after, the facility
leased one building on the property to house a district court. 281 No property taxes are owed on
that site either because of the senior center’s charitable status. The presence of the district court
and the police cars that drove daily to it, increased the sense of security in the neighborhood. It
also slowed the speed of traffic around the site, delighting the local residents who had always
had concerns about their children playing outside. 282

AES decided to keep 1.3 acres for its company headquarters. In that property, 10,000 sq.
ft. of building space is used by AES and 4,000 sq. ft. is leased to the Chester County Historical
Society. 283 The remaining parcel, 3.2 acres, is leased as a business plaza that is home to a public
indoor skateboard park, an accompanying hobby and pro-shop, a pizza shop, a private water
treatment company, an art gallery, and Chester County Cares social service agency. 284 The
skateboard park provides a recreational opportunity for thousands of youths a month and is the
first of its kind to be built on a brownfield. 285
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When the project was completed, Senya estimated that the remediation and demolition of
the site cost about $1.3 million. 286 The estimated building hard costs for the three building
constructed was $6.5 million. 287 The soft costs that included legal, planning, and architectural
fees were estimated to be about $500,000. 288 The entire 8.5-acre site was purchased for
$100,000. Properties adjacent to and nearby the Goodwill Business Park have increased in
value, which their owners attribute to the AES redevelopment project. In addition, two blocks
away from the Business Park, Habitat for Humanity is constructing 17 new homes and a 12,000
sq. ft retail strip mall has been completed and occupied. 289 Today, an acre of industrial land in
West Chester, Pa sells for $1 million (Chester County has become the richest county in the
state). 290 West Chester has long recognized and embraced the benefits of land recycling at many
properties in its borough. The Chester County Industrial Development Authority has the most
active Brownfield Task Force in the all of the suburban metropolitan area. 291

AES’ brownfield redevelopment project created at least 50 new full-time jobs and
numerous part-time positions on site. 292 It remediated an environmental hazard and made the
land suitable for economic reuse, while returning it to a taxable asset for the community. The
Good Will Business Park was a tremendous marketing success story and a direct benefit of a
good, trusting relationship with the community. By embracing the community, AES avoided
costly legal fees, public relations campaigns and construction delays. It demonstrates that
brownfield redevelopment can be a win-win situation for the developer, the community, and the
environment.

F. Lessons Learned

The Goodwill Business Park demonstrates unique entrepreneurial spirit and initiative on behalf
of Alliance Environmental Systems. A developer or investor must research the federal, state,
and local tax incentives available for the site proposed for remediation. In this case study, the
investor was able to utilize incentives on all three levels of government: the EPA/IRS Federal
Brownfields Tax Incentive, the PA LRA Act 2 incentives, and LERTA. In total, AES estimated
it received over $850,000 in tax relief (over 8 times the purchase price). By receiving this tax
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relief for a period of time, it allowed AES to establish itself as a business and recoup the hard
costs of demolition, clean-up, and construction and the soft costs of planning and legal fees.
After receiving this ‘reprieve’ from government, AES decided that it wanted to give back
something to the community. 293 The Good Will Business Park was designed to reinvest in the
community by providing space for a firehouse, district court house, senior center, social service
agency, a historical society, an art gallery, and an indoor youth skateboard park and hobby shop.
As a result, AES not only remediated an environmental hazard but boosted community spirit and
economic development in the surrounding community. It also marked the first time ever that a
firehouse and a skateboard park were built on a remediated brownfield. 294 This case study also
demonstrates the cooperation, willingness, and speed on the part of the state DEP in facilitating
the tax relief application process and the remediation procedures on the site. Finally, the case
study demonstrated that is a good idea to purchase the site as a whole, and then divide and sell
off sections to seek maximum profit gain. Although, it is evident that AES’ main priority was
not to turn a remarkable profit, it was able to purchase the property at a very low price
($100,000) and sell off half of it for a net gain of almost $2 million. 295 It was able to act as a
leasing manager for a significant amount of commercial space on the site that gives it a nice
steady flow of cash to help sustain its business endeavors.

VIII. Schmidt’s Brewery Site: A Controversial Developer in a Sensitive
Community
A. History of Site and Developer

The site of this brownfield redevelopment project was once home to the 140-year old Schmidt’s
Brewery. Situated at the intersection of 2nd Street and Girard Avenue, in the Northern Liberties’
section of Philadelphia, the odd-shaped site is located just near the Delaware River and at the
base of a designated American Street Empowerment Zone. Its unique location makes it eligible
for Tax Incremental Financing (TIFs) benefits if its investor chooses to build a commercial
shopping center that would encourage further economic development. 296

In 2000, a controversial developer named Bart Blatstein won a bid at a local sheriff’s sale
and purchased the 12-acre former Schmidt’s Brewery site for a mere $1.8 million. 297 Blatstein,
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and his company Tower Investments, are best known for their development of Delaware Avenue
in South Philadelphia, where they lured big-box retail outlets such as Home Depot, Wal Mart,
and a United Artists Theater to former industrial sites. 298 Since the purchase, Blatstein has
continued to accumulate more property in Northern Liberties. Tower Investments currently owns
17 percent of the land in Northern Liberties. 299 Blatstein is quickly making a name for himself
as the developer in Philadelphia by enlisting in several other high-profile development proposals
in North Philadelphia, Penn Landing, and suburban Coatesville. 300 Upon acquisition of the
property, Blatstein publicly noted that the North Philadelphia corridor is in need of major retail
and residential development. A commercial retail strip on Blatstein’s newly acquired land would
entice new development in the surrounding area and possibly unite the corridor with the rest of
the city. It would also grant him eligibility for the $4 million TIF incentive proposed by the
City. 301

B. The Community of Northern Liberties

Northern Liberties has experienced a tremendous amount of change during the last 300 years.
When the first settlers moved to Philadelphia and purchased land within the city limits they were
given a free parcel of land in the “northern wilderness” on the city’s outskirts. Over time, these
“liberty lands” were transformed into a farming community and eventually a middle class
suburb. During the Industrial Revolution, Northern Liberties was home to a booming
manufacturing district with several successful lumberyards and breweries. 302 The onset of
deindustrialization in the 1950’s and the subsequent mass migration of the middle class to the
suburbs had a drastic effect on the neighborhood and it quickly evolved into an urban wasteland
of crime and poverty. 303

In the late 1970’s, artists began to migrate into the community looking for cheap rent and
large spaces for their studios. 304 The land was highly undervalued and real estate visionaries had
begun to take interest in the area. When the nation’s economy fell in the late 1980’s many
speculators fled. Crime, prostitution, and homelessness lurked in many of the abandoned
buildings and vacant land. 305 However, people with hope and vision that were determined to
purchase a dream house for cheap found Northern Liberties appealing. Undervalued property
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and a variety of unique bars and restaurants enticed a slow trickle of buyers and soon a
community began to form. 306 In 1996, neighborhood residents worked together to transform a 2acre Superfund site to a beautiful community garden and neighborhood park. 307 The
collaborative efforts of the young and old, black and white, and creative and hard-working,
helped transform the community. The Northern Liberties of today is a diverse community
brimming with pride that strives to unite its population of over 4,000. 308

C. Remediation Plans

On May 16, 2003, Tower Investments submitted a Notice of Intent to Remediate to the DEP
stating that the “soil is contaminated with fuel oil no. 6, inorganics, leaded gasoline, other
organics, PAH and PCB and the groundwater is contaminated with chlorinated solvents, fuel oil
no. 6, leaded gasoline, and other inorganics.” 309 Tower Investments proposed to remediate the
site to meet special industrial area requirements. 310 A posting in the Philadelphia Daily News on
the same date summarized the proposed remediation measures to “include the closure of four
underground storage tanks, removal of containerized wastes and above ground storage residuals,
the removal of asbestos-containing materials and the removal of PCB-containing materials.” 311 It
also revealed that the property will be used for non-residential purposes. In March 2004, another
Notice of Intent to Remediate was submitted to DEP announcing that the future use of the
property will be a combination of residential and commercial purposes. 312 Tower Investments
was considering “capping” most of the soil beneath the structures as part of the redevelopment
procedures. 313 According to the DEP website, the site’s remediation is “still in progress” making
it unclear which clean-up standard it plans to attain. 314 According to Jon Edelstein, the Schmidt’s
Brewery remedial plan has been deemed deficient multiple times. However, Edelstein claims
that the site was never deemed a public health hazard. 315

As with many brownfield projects it is often difficult to secure a lender to fund the
remediation. For a newspaper article in 2000, Bart Blatstein stated that First Republic Bank was
“much more aggressive” about getting the loan than other lending institutions that he usually
uses, and more flexible about conditions. Blatstein continues, “There are 120 things that have to
be done just to get this site clean for development.” He added, “This was a shotgun type of a
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wedding. All or nothing. And First Republic stepped up to the plate in a flash.” 316 First
Republic, unique among most banks, has become well-known for arranging crucial early
financing for high-profile urban projects. For the veteran developer Bart Blatstein, it provided
him $3.9 million to demolish the Schmidt’s Brewery Site and prepare the site for commercial
reuse. 317

Along with the remediation activities, Pennsylvania’s Land Recycling Act requires a
developer to “develop and implement” a public involvement program (PIP) if the municipality
requests it. The developer is required to post the summarized findings of any risk assessment
plan and remedial investigation report in a local newspaper or community bulletin. Any public
comments in response to the PIP must be included in the reports submitted to the DEP. 318
Blatstein and Tower Investments failed to submit a PIP, despite the mayor’s request in 2004. 319
Residents were furiously complaining that construction and remediation were already being
performed on the site without any feedback from the neighbors. Philadelphia’s brownfields
specialist, John Edelstein, acknowledged that since the proposed development is in such close
proximity to a thriving residential neighborhood, there must be a higher degree of sensitivity. 320

D. A Laundry List of Environmental Violations

First, local neighborhood residents feared that new construction on the site would disturb and
possibly displace existing contaminants and pollutants into the surrounding community. On
February 1, 2001, the DEP issued a violation to Tower for failing to remove RACM (regulated
asbestos containing material) prior to demolition. 321 Tower accused several contractors of
negligence for the incident and terminated them from the contract. The demolition company filed
a lawsuit against Tower Investments for failing to remove RACM and other hazardous materials
before demolition as it had agreed to do under contract. 322 On February 28, 2002, a neighbor
noticed that work was being conducted on the site in the middle of the night and called the
police. 323 An independent investigation did not reveal any documentation of the charges levied
against the developer or result in any cease work orders, but the neighborhood suspicion skyrocketed. In addition, the president of Northern Liberties Neighborhood Association (NLNA)
wrote a letter to Bart Blatstein stating that several neighbors have issued a variety of complaints
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regarding the behavior and demeanor of the demolition crew and would therefore like to request
that Tower Investments be willing to take full responsibility for the activities of its employees
and contracted agents at its properties. 324 Blatstein failed to respond to the letter, reinforcing his
former position that he cannot be held responsible for all the activities of his contractors.

On June 26, 2002, another gross act of negligence unfolded when just after midnight
police found Tower Investment’s contractor Philadelphia Building Group’s president, Moneer
Farhat, burying approximately 100 cubic yards of “sand” contaminated with PCB’s under six
feet of earth. 325 Farhat told officers he was burying the PCB sand “to make it safe until he could
notify the state,” according to the police report. 326 City and state officials claimed nothing
happened with regards to the transport of the dangerous chemicals. City officials told an
investigative reporter from the City Paper that no documentation existed regarding the incident
and therefore had no knowledge of its occurrence. No violations were reported on the date the
incident was witnessed, according to an initial “Community Right to Know Request” form. 327
When a resident appealed to the DEP to investigate further, a lawyer for DEP, Andy Hartzell,
dismissed concerns because an official in the City Law Department, Patrick O’Neill, claimed it
was nothing more than a “drunk guy on a backhoe.” 328 Both the criminal and civil authorities
who investigated the matter independently concluded that there was no burying or dumping of
PCBs, asbestos, or other hazardous materials. However, in an email to a concerned community
activist, a DEP official investigating the matter agreed that “it [the Moneer incident] certainly
reeks of suspicion…but sometimes there are other explanations…” 329

Further “code violations” surfaced after community members launched an investigation
into Tower’s activities. Although at first denied by city officials and absent in a “Community
Right to Know Request” by the neighborhood, investigators discovered the City had issued a
violation to Tower Investments on June 27, 2002. 330 The Philadelphia Department of Licenses
and Inspection (L&I) issued a citation to Northern Liberties Development Inc. for allowing
“hazardous materials” to run into a city waterway and failing to notify the Fire Department of the
discovery of PCBs in the soil so they could incorporate into their fire safety plan. 331 L&I also
claimed that the accused party neglected to follow federal standards for PCB disposal, violated
asbestos control regulation, and failed to provide the city with documentation on environmental
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remediation plans. 332 The Northern Liberties Development Company was an affiliate of Tower
Investments, primarily owned by Bart Blatstein. The citation included a $5,000 fine to settle the
violation. 333

Local residents blamed the initial phases of Blatstein’s construction projects for flooding
their basements after the torrential rain storms. They claimed washers, dryers, and even cars
were destroyed as a result of the flooding. 334 Furthermore, Tower’s primary plan for
remediation was to “cap” a majority of the site to contain the pollutants in certain areas. This
method of remediation involves pouring asphalt over large areas of the site, potentially causing
even more flooding. When confronted about the issue, representatives from Tower claimed that
they would approach the city as the neighborhood’s partners to petition for more capacity in the
drainage systems. Many residents remained furious and threatened to withdrawal any support
and consensus for Blatstein’s construction plans until the issue was resolved. 335

During a community meeting held by the Northern Liberties Neighborhood Association
(NLNA) that the researcher attended on October 27, 2005, a number of neighborhood residents
voiced concerns about the possibility of different contaminants and pollutants getting blown or
washed onto their adjacent properties. They primarily worried that PCBs would wash onto their
property and contaminate their water supply. They also demanded to know exactly what type of
chemicals had been found on the site and what the associated health risks were. The city’s
brownfield manager, John Edelstein, claimed that he was not at liberty to discuss the specific
chemicals but he recommended the citizens go to a local library to review the public information
available on record. The citizens were further incensed when Edelstein, in a local paper, accused
the community of exaggerating the environmental concerns in order to delay development of the
site. 336 Expressions of neighborhood discontent, anxiety, and concern are familiar topics in the
public meetings surrounding the discussion of the proposed development on the site.

In an interview, Jon Edelstein revealed several other factors regarding the neighborhoods
concerns that should be taken into consideration. He stated that most of the discontent arose
when Tower Investments refused to grant the neighborhood residents designated parking spaces
upon the construction of the development. 337 He claimed that residents lashed out at Tower
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because of their anger over a predicted surge in competition for neighborhood parking spaces
when the development was completed. Second, Northern Liberties residents, in attempt to
further halt construction claimed that they were a community that demanded environmental
justice considerations. 338 When in fact the socio-economic status of the community showed that
the average market price for homes in the neighborhood around the proposed development
approach or exceed a half million dollars and the residents are mostly Caucasian. In summary,
Mr. Edelstein believed that the neighborhood residents have a lot of money and time on their
hands “to milk” the redevelopment process. 339

Bart has decidedly changed his mind about building a sprawling retail complex. In a
statement to the New York Times in 2005, Blatstein claimed he planned to build a $100 million
development, to be completed in 2007, on the former Schmidt’s site. 340 The complex will
include 1,000 apartments, half a million square feet of retail space and 100,000 square feet for
“edgy, creative types”, he told the New York Times. 341 A zoning variance was necessary from the
city because the lot was originally zoned for industrial and commercial use. Today, construction
on the site is still ongoing, with only a few apartment buildings approaching completion. Much
of the site still contains large piles of rubble and debris and huge mounds of dirt.

E. A Developer’s Ill-Advised Choices

Soon after the City Department of Licenses and Inspections issued the environmental code
violations against Tower Investments related to the June 26/27, 2002, incident, Blatstein claimed
he had fired Philadelphia Building Group (PBG) from all of his Northern Liberties projects and
that he would not rehire them for any future projects. 342 However, a year later neighborhood
residents claimed to have seen PBG back on the premises of the Schmidt’s site doing work.
Despite the reckless and irresponsible behavior of the Group, Blatstein chose to renege on his
agreement with the NLNA to terminate his dealings with PBG. 343 This was confirmed when an
outside group, Soil Safe, filed a lawsuit against PBG for contract issues after the time when
Blatstein stated that PBG was terminated from working on the site. 344 On June 8, 2004, PBG
paid $20,000 in fines for multiple environmental violations throughout the city, including the
demolitions of the Ortlieb’s and Schmidt’s site. 345
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The developer’s response over the disturbing and reckless behavior of his contractor,
PBG, is very unsettling. Unfortunately, the incident only raises questions, while providing very
few answers. While there are conflicting beliefs that he and the city had made great strides to
cover up or downplay the incident, it is clear that he had a chance to mitigate its impact by
reacting sensibly and responsibly and permanently terminating PBG from future work on the
site. Instead, he misled the community into thinking he had, when it is likely that PBG was just
asked to keep a lower profile on the site. Is this incident indicative of the entrenched bureaucracy
of real estate development in the city of Philadelphia? If Bart Blatstein did not have such a large
stake in numerous other revitalization projects across the city, would he have gotten away with
as many missteps as he did? Does Blatstein’s well-intentioned efforts to revitalize other
economically depressed areas throughout the city excuse his behavior on this particular
development project? Despite Tower’s role in misleading and infuriating the Northern Liberties’
community, the city claims the public involvement process at the Schmidt’s site was fairly
implemented. What does this say about the effectiveness of the state-mandated public
involvement process as a whole?

Throughout the process, he chose not to involve the DEP in the public involvement plan
when they quite possibly could have been effective in easing the community’s concerns. Bart
Blatstein and Tower Investments chose to take the more time-consuming and costly road in
redeveloping the Schmidt’s site when he could have easily avoided it. While the site is taking
much longer to redevelop than anticipated, Blatstein is proud of his accomplishments thus far.
Like many experienced investors, Blatstein is focusing his efforts elsewhere in the city, while
reaping large financial returns on past deals.

F. Other Tower Investment Development Projects in Philadelphia

In 2003, Bart Blatstein sold the two shopping centers he developed on Columbus Boulevard in
South Philadelphia—Riverview Plaza and Columbus Crossing—for $75 million. 346 The
transaction represented about 60 percent of Blatstein’s South Philadelphia property. One
newspaper reporter commended the developer for acquiring the once-abandoned industrial sites
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in 1986, when others in real estate saw little future for the area. The reporter writes, “Bart created
something out of nothing…” 347

In September 2004, the Redevelopment Authority approved the selection of Tower
Investments as the developer for the Avenue North Project, a mixed used residential and
entertainment complex at Broad Street and Cecil B. Moore Avenue in an economically depressed
North Philadelphia corridor. 348 In September 2005, City Councilman Darrell Clark announced
that he would be seeking $5 million in tax breaks (TIFs) for Blatstein’s Avenue North Project
from the PIDC. 349 January 2007 marked the grand opening of the Pearl Theatre, a 1,300 seat,
seven-screen, state-of-the-art movie theatre in North Philadelphia. It serves as a key component
of the $100 million anchor project of the Avenue North revitalization program undertaken by
Blatstein’s Tower Investments Inc. 350 At the opening, the developer stated, “The Pearl is about
doing a good thing, yes, and being a part of the rebirth and revitalization of the neighborhood. It
demonstrates that through the efforts of many, first-class development can occur in
economically-disadvantaged areas.” 351 The new theater joined 30 retail storefronts, the Shops at
Avenue North, and a 12-story student housing tower called the Edge, adjacent to Temple
University’s campus. 352

Governor Ed Rendell originally conceived the Avenue North idea when he was mayor in
1993. However, he failed to find a developer who was confident in the investment. 353 Governor
Rendell stated at the opening, “We’ve done a good job with housing [in North Philadelphia], but
without commercial development it means little. Now that we have both, it means a great deal
for the community and for the city. This is going to be a permanent contributor to change,”
adding that when New York developers failed to take up the challenge, “It took a Philly boy,
Bart Blatstein, to get it done.” 354

According to reports, the development went smoothly and there was little complaint from
the neighbors. Blatstein claimed he was proud that 30 percent of the work on the complex was
done by minority contractors and that it was important to be inclusive with the surrounding
community. 355 A resident and barber who cuts hair around the corner, thinks the theater would
be better for nearby businesses and for the young people in the community. 356

47

The development processes of the Blatstein’s two major projects in Northern Liberties
and North Broad Street seem to be as different as night and day. The Schmidt’s site was notable
for multiple environmental violations during remediation: improper removal of asbestos,
allowing hazardous run-off into waterways, excessive dust release, and alleged illegal burial of
dangerous PCBs. The public involvement plan mandated by Act 2 was ill-conceived and poorly
implemented leaving community members furious over the developer’s negligence and deceit.
Demolition and remediation had begun long before the community or even the DEP was
formally notified. The city had several opportunities to intervene and facilitate a smoother
community process and failed, but chose to turn the other cheek because of an entrenched
relationship with the developer on numerous other projects in the city. Seven years after the
purchase of the property the development is not close to being finished.

On the other hand, Blatstein’s Avenue North Project was a seemingly run-away success
in the economically desperate North Philadelphia Corridor. It provided a place for neighborhood
children to go to watch movies instead of hanging out on the street. It provided safe student
housing for an expanding Temple University. Last, it brought commercial and retail stores to the
area that never would have considered the area before, providing job opportunities and eliciting
future commercial development.

G. Lessons Learned

Although Blatstein is an extremely controversial developer that some neighborhoods
understandably distrust, it cannot be denied that Bart Blatstein and Tower Investments have
played a large role in revitalizing neighborhoods in Philadelphia that many developers would
have never considered investing in. Many of these brownfield sites would have remained
blighted, neglected, and contaminated today, had Blatstein not had the vision to revitalize them.
But his capacity as a visionary and experienced developer, does not excuse the irresponsible
actions employed at the Schmidt’s site. He must be held accountable for his actions, regardless
of his past accomplishments and future real-estate bids in the city. The community’s input and
perspective should command more respect and consideration than what was demonstrated at this
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site. A developer must realize that when taking on a brownfield reclamation project, his or her
decisions and actions affect how other future brownfield redevelopment processes across the
country are perceived by the public. Bart Blatstein made a conscious choice to ignore the
community’s voice. In doing so, he created bad publicity for Tower Investments and many other
brownfield redevelopers who may now face fearful communities that are aware of the situation
that occurred on the Schmidt’s site in Northern Liberties. Blatstein’s stubbornness only
contributed to the cloud of controversy and bad publicity that has followed many of his
redevelopment projects. Fortunately, not all private developers that invest in brownfields share
his same attitude. One major brownfield developer in the Philadelphia area, O’Neill Properties,
claims that it refuses to implement any redevelopment project without majority support from the
community; it cites extensive project delays and extra costs as primary reasons for the
importance of executing a meaningful public involvement process. 357

IX. Prescription for Brownfields

A. Recommendations for Local Government
Local government officials play an important role by guiding public subsidies, supporting fair
land values, coordinating permitting, providing information, and regulating contamination on a
property. 358 Local governments also stand to make large gains if brownfields are redeveloped.
The appearance of taking positive measure in reclaiming vacant lots can be great for politicians
looking to be reelected. Many development projects also yield considerable tax gain for the city
government. Owners of many abandoned properties often fail to pay taxes and therefore
contribute no revenue to the local government. For both political and fiscal reasons, doing
nothing about brownfields is no longer an option. 359

The first recommendation for local officials is to rezone brownfield properties to meet
realistic demands. For example, if an industrially-zoned brownfield is not likely to be
redeveloped for industrial purposes, officials should proactively rezone it to attract investment.
If officials fail to rezone for future realistic land use, properties may reflect lower prices for well-
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located, viable brownfields. 360 In two of the case studies analyzed above, flexibility of zoning
practices played a critical part in the properties end use and impact on surrounding
neighborhood. In the third case study, the Navy Yard, the PIDC is currently getting the
residential zoning restriction amended on the property in order to maximize the use and
economic impact of the property. John Grady indicated that a portion of the property will be
rezoned for residential purposes. As demonstrated in the Act 2’s mandatory public involvement
plan, the community must always be informed and given time to comment if zoning changes are
proposed. Under no circumstances should a local government allow a developer to use zoning
considerations to bargain with the community, as suggested by the events at the Schmidt’s
Brewery site.

A second recommendation for a local government is to develop an inventory of
brownfield properties. 361 Local government should collect as much public data as possible about
contaminated properties as they exist (assessments, listed sites, past uses, etc…) and make the
information available to interested parties. 362 According to Mr. Edelstein, there is no citymaintained database that provides a comprehensive inventory of the brownfield sites available
for redevelopment in Philadelphia. 363 However, the EPA is currently implementing its
Assessment Cleanup and Redevelopment Exchange System (ACRES) that requires all EPA
brownfield grant recipients that use federal money to assess or clean a site to submit pertinent
redevelopment information into the database. 364 The objective of the ACRES program is to
provide means for easier quantification of the success of local brownfield programs across the
country. 365

Third, local officials should rank brownfields in the order according to which they need
assistance. Officials should prioritize designated brownfields that need immediate attention
based on risk to public health or economic development potential. 366 Brownfield properties that
may be used for land banking or long term interim uses should be ranked lower, while properties
with intended use as economic development or open space should be ranked higher. 367 In
Philadelphia’s brownfield program, properties located along the Delaware and Schuylkill
riverfront are given priority in conjunction with the city’s New River City Project. Without
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proper management, the local government runs the risk of misallocating scarce brownfield
resources to potential investors who would otherwise relocate to suburban greenfields. 368

A fourth recommendation is to have local government establish an intermediary
organization to serve a leadership role and provide support in the redevelopment process. The
involvement of not-for profit companies in the brownfield arena is not uncommon. Typically,
they seek to revitalize properties with good market potential that may be too small or large or
troubled for private investors to consider. 369 Most of these non-profit companies take title to the
site. Some proactively prepare industrial sites for development, which may keep remediation
costs down for the developer. 370 The Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation has
played an integral part in acquiring the site from the Navy, conducting some remedial
preparation, and soliciting private investors to develop designated districts. Public-private
partnerships are essential for successful projects as they facilitate cooperation between the
different levels of government involved.

A fifth recommendation for local government is to appoint a coordinator to serve as a
reference point for brownfield management in the city. In Philadelphia, the brownfield program
is housed under the Department of Commerce, and its coordinator’s title is Industrial Reuse
Manager, reflecting its primary objective to reclaim brownfields for economic development. The
Department also administers federal and state business incentive programs, provides loans, and
provides site selection and land acquisition services to any companies that are interested in
relocating or expanding into the Philadelphia market. Because it administers the KOZ program
and incentive programs in the city, the Department is well-versed in its locations and benefits
and could appropriately guide developers to certain sites. In addition, specialized entities such as
Pennsylvania’s Brownfield Action Teams can help promote cooperation and expedite the
developing process.

A sixth recommendation for local government is to develop an initiative that will
remediate blighted properties with little economic value as green space or neighborhood
facilities. It is a reality that market demand is not sufficient for a large percentage of brownfield
nationwide. It is a worthy objective for the local government to promote the cleaning and

51

beautification of these properties to revitalize community spirit. Mayors Street’s Neighborhood
Transformation Initiative is a good example of a local government sponsored initiative to reduce
urban blight through the demolition of abandoned buildings and clearing of debris and trash from
vacant lots. The non-profit organization, Philadelphia Green, avidly supported by local
government officials, has achieved national recognition for its efforts in cleaning, greening, and
maintaining vacant lots. It also has be responsible for initiating numerous community gardens as
long term interim uses on some brownfield properties. Greensgrow is located on a brownfield
site in North Philadelphia and has been a run-way success in the local community by providing
fresh vegetables to a number of local restaurants and markets.

B. Recommendations for Developers
The following recommendations for developers stem from the case study analyses presented
above. First, if possible, it is a good idea to select a site that is highly visible, heavily trafficked,
and in the path of future public investment. An ideal site would have good road access and be
within close proximity to public transportation. A developer should also consider the natural
features of a site—waterfront, good land configuration, wetlands. The Philadelphia Naval Yard
project holds excellent opportunities for public recreation through its waterfront property, piers,
and dry docks. A major highway, I-95, provides excellent regional access for commuters and
residents alike. The enormous scale of the Navy Yard makes it an especially unique acquisition.

A second recommendation for developers is to buy a larger site, clean all of it, and sell
off part of it later. 371 Alliance Environmental Systems made a good decision to purchase all 8.5
acres of the former pharmaceutical giant’s property, remediate all of it, and then sell 4 acres to
the township and another private entity for a considerable profit. For most developers looking to
make serious returns on their investment, the larger the site the more potential for profit.

A third recommendation would be to purchase the property as heavily discounted as
possible, obtain the property at foreclosure, or purchase the mortgage of the property. AES was
able to negotiate an extremely low price of only $100,000 for all 8.5 acres of the West Chester
property because the seller, Wyeth, was impressed by Alliance’s ample insurance policy and
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therefore diminished likelihood that Wyeth would be liable in the future for the contamination.
Bart Blatstein of Tower Investments purchased the former 12-acre Schmidt’s Brewery site for a
low $1.8 million at a city operated sheriff’s sale.

A fourth recommendation to consider when redeveloping a brownfield is to build a high
density, mixed-use development. Incorporating commercial, retail, and/or residential plans into a
development plan can reap large profits. 372 Building at higher density can also distribute
expenses over a larger project. 373 Public subsidies may also be larger for a larger project.
According to its Master Plan, the Philadelphia Naval Yard wants to maximize activity on the site
by encouraging 24-hour use of its site. During the day it will rely on the commercial activity of
the regional business complex. After working hours it hopes to attract joggers, walkers, bikers,
and other recreational activity, while in the evening it hopes to lure retail shoppers and restaurant
and bar patrons. A change in zoning will allow the Naval Yard site to be used for residential
purposes and both rentals and home ownership will be encouraged. AES’ Good Will Business
Park is an excellent example of mixed-use for commercial, retail, and recreation purposes. The
Business Park is the first redeveloped brownfield to have a public firehouse and an indoor
skateboard park on site. It is home to Alliance Environmental Services’ corporate headquarters, a
senior center, and a district court, while also providing lease space to a historical society, an art
gallery, a hobby shop, and a pizza shop. A diversity of uses on a site will in most cases bring
maximum returns on initial investments. If possible, having the site rezoned for different uses
before purchase may save costly delays in the long run and add critical value to the property.

A fifth recommendation to consider for developers is to design the remediation plan of
the site to minimize costs. A developer may be able to save costs and avoid project delays by
‘capping’, or building a parking lot over contaminated soil to contain it; effectively seal all
underground chambers that may hold hazardous materials; and avoid future excavation by
putting utilities above ground. 374 However, by no means should a developer cut corners and
develop a deficient remediation plan that would put the community’s health at risk. Do not forget
to consider the impact on the surrounding neighborhood and the need to involve the public in
your development plan. A cautionary example of what can happen if a developer fails to
effectively involve the community can be found in Tower Investments’ plan to remediate the
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Schmidt’s site. Bart Blatstein failed to submit a sufficient remediation plan to the DEP and was
cited several times for violating local and state environmental laws. It took him almost a year
after the Notice of Intent to Remediate was posted to hold a public meeting to discuss the
community’s concern. 375 When a public meeting was finally scheduled, it occurred at a most
inconvenient time, in the middle of the busy winter holiday season, when the community was
most pressed for time. Some members of the community believed it was purposely scheduled to
avoid extensive public participation in the redevelopment project. 376

As a final recommendation for developers, it is absolutely critical for truly successful
brownfield redevelopment projects to embrace the local community and consider their benefit.
After receiving a reprieve from the local, state, and federal governments through tax incentives
and liability protection, Senya Isayeff of Alliance Environmental Systems decided he wanted to
reinvigorate the surrounding community by providing economic, civic, and recreational
opportunities on the former brownfield site. 377 The vision of Alliance Environmental Systems
and the creation of Good Will Business Park was remarkable because it embraced the concept of
redevelopment of a brownfield not solely for the benefit of the developer, but also for the benefit
of the community. This successful venture reflected the mission of the DEP and the
Pennsylvania Land Recycling Program, that were created not only to facilitate the cleanup of
these polluted sites, but to have the redevelopment benefit the surrounding communities that had
tolerated the blight for so long. 378

X. Conclusion
The cumulative effect of the lack of brownfield development nationwide has been to accelerate
urban sprawl and encourage urban blight and economic distress. The recent regulatory reforms
and state and local initiatives designed to provide information and financial incentives to private
developers have virtually eliminated uncertainty and liability for innocent landowners and
drastically decreased cleanup costs. They have created opportunities for developers
knowledgeable about the problem who may find undervalued and underutilized properties they
can turn into considerable profit. More importantly, the case studies analyzed above demonstrate
that non-environmental factors and willingness to reinvest in the community play an increasingly
significant role in the successful outcome of the project. The greater Philadelphia area has a
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wealth of brownfields of all shapes and sizes that represent enormous economic and social value.
The examples above demonstrate that creativity, entrepreneurship, community engagement, and
collective vision can transform brownfields into rich developments that will improve the quality
of life for the community as a whole.
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